

istry of Social Welfare had to start from scratch creating the machinery to scope with the massive influx of refugees and other war victims. Its weak and largely inexperienced organization was overwhelmed and disrupted time and time again, first by almost a million new refugees in 1967 and 1968, next by over a million victims of the VC/NVA Tet offensive in 1968, then by over 200,000 repatriates from Cambodia in the summer of 1970, and again by over 300,000 flood victims in the Northern provinces in the fall of 1970.

Under these circumstances, it is remarkable that the Ministry managed since 1967 to distribute benefits of one kind or another to 5.9 million persons, made some progress toward upgrading more than 800 refugee sites, improving the infrastructure of the hamlets to which the refugees have returned, and largely re-establish the repatriates from Cambodia into normal living conditions.

To all this, A.I.D. technical assistance and financial support have made substantial contributions. Counting only direct dollar inputs by A.I.D.'s Vietnam Bureau, the value of PL-480—Title II commodities and the dollar equivalents of counterpart funds generated by the Commodity Import Program and made available to the GVN Ministry of Social Welfare, A.I.D. has spent between 1967 and now more than a quarter of a billion dollars in support of refugee and social welfare programs in Vietnam.

I don't intend to attempt to convey the notion that everything that could be done for refugees has been done. I do, however, hope that the performance of both A.I.D. and the GVN can be measured in terms of what is possible within the constraints imposed by an unconventional wartime situation. I fully understand and appreciate the fact that the GAO auditors were working under a time limitation which afforded them no opportunity to attempt to evaluate the positive achievements which have been registered.

I trust you will find the attachments responsive. Please be assured that we do appreciate the very helpful advice and suggestions that have come from your Subcommittee and the GAO. Evaluations of our assistance programs by external sources are always welcome, particularly in this case in which we share the common humanitarian objective of seeking ways to prevent avoidable war-induced suffering and insecurity.

Sincerely yours,

MAURICE WILLIAMS,
(For John A. Hannah.)

AID COMMENTS ON GAO REPORT ENTITLED "CONTINUING DIFFICULTIES
IN ASSISTING WAR VICTIMS IN VIETNAM"

(The GAO findings and conclusions quoted below are drawn from the GAO Digest.)

1. Program Management—GAO

"Although some changes have taken place in the roles of the Government of Vietnam and the United States, overall program management remains in the hands of the Government of Vietnam; advice is provided by American personnel."

Comments

Unlike other GAO Reports, this one is essentially an examination into the operations of a foreign government, the Government of Vietnam. The refugee and other welfare programs in Vietnam are administered by the GVN Ministry of Social Welfare under the direction of the Prime Minister. In program management the role of the U.S. Government is limited to that of advisors to the Ministry and its provincial services. The Ministry establishes the level of benefits, determines the location of, and manages camps and institutions, allocates with USG concurrence the counterpart funds made available from the American Aid Chapter and the Special Fund, and disburses these funds. The only leverage the U.S. Government has is through the financial support it gives to these programs and the technical advice given by American officials to the officials of the GVN—the power of the pursestring and the power of persuasion. Most of the difficulties discussed in this report can, therefore, be resolved only by the GVN.

It is notable, however, that contrary to earlier reports this GAO Report does not contain any charges of misuse or diversion of funds or commodities by the GVN or of any failure on the part of the American advisors to perform their functions properly.

The principal criticisms contained in the report—the recognition of new refugees, the inadequacies of the statistics, the failure to develop social welfare programs in general and programs for the urban areas in particular; the inadequacies of some of the camp sites and of the hamlets to which the refugees have returned, and the delay in the delivery of the benefits to which the refugees are entitled, are directed at the Government of Vietnam, not against the Agency for International Development.

The questions raised about the generation of new refugees by American and allied military actions, are rooted in problems of military strategy and tactics, over which AID has no control.

Since 1968, the relationship between the Ministry of Social Welfare and the CORDS/Refugee Directorate (now the War Victims Directorate), has undergone far reaching changes. As the experience of the Ministry increased and its staff grew in both numbers and competence, it has become more and more independent and self-reliant. This is as it should be. Any reassertion of greater American control would be contrary to the President's policy of Vietnamization.

Meanwhile, critics of shortcomings need to bear in mind that as long as the war continues, the GVN efforts to improve the welfare of the war victims will remain severely limited by security conditions in the countryside and shortages of manpower, material and funds.

2. Priority Accorded to Refugee Relief—GAO

"Neither the United States nor the Government of Vietnam has established priorities for U.S. assistance programs. The primary emphasis during 1965-69 was on providing emergency relief in the form of resettlement allowances and temporary homes to the estimated 3.5 million refugees while the needs of other war victims such as widows, orphans, and the handicapped received less attention. Likewise, development of the sites in which refugees and former refugees are located has not received much attention."

Comments

The GAO is correct in pointing out that from 1965 to 1969 the GVN placed primary emphasis on providing emergency relief to the refugees. Considering the limitations of their capability mentioned above, this is again as it should have been. During 1968, normal refugee relief operations had come to a virtual standstill because of the Tet and May offensives and their aftermath. Throughout 1969 and deep in 1970 the Ministry concentrated on delivering the benefits it had promised the refugees and which it had not been able to deliver, in many instances, for a much as a year or even two. It succeeded in accomplishing this task to a large extent. In 1969 and 1970 it distributed refugee and war victims benefits to more than 2½ million persons even though normal operations were once again disrupted by the emergency created by the flight of more than 200,000 ethnic Vietnamese from Cambodia to Vietnam in the Summer of 1970, and by the floods in the Northern provinces which made over 300,000 persons homeless.

It is not correct to say that neither the U.S. Government nor the GVN has established priorities for U.S. assistance programs. Both the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan and the 1971 Community Defense and Development Plan clearly establish the upgrading of campsites which must continue to be used and the improvement of the hamlets to which the refugees have returned as the two highest priorities in the overall war victims program.

3. (a) Reporting System—GAO

"Since February 1968 the refugee reporting system has undergone three major revisions, but the information being reported is still conflicting, confusing and inconsistent, in part because it is compiled by untrained personnel. Reliability of the reported data should be improved."

Comments

The GAO Report states correctly that CORDS and MSW are now using the fourth reporting system since 1968, and a fifth one is now in process of preparation.

Designed originally as a statistical system to count monthly the number of refugees by province, Corps and nationwide to obtain a running record of the magnitude of the refugee problem, the reporting systems have been gradually converted into a management tool to guide the decisions of American and Vietnamese officials concerning the deployment of personnel and material resources and to measure and monitor program performances. In the process, the systems have become steadily more complex and voluminous. As the classification of

refugees and other war victims, the variety and flexibility of benefit claims, the classification of refugee sites and the classification of claimants who had received all benefits to which they were entitled were steadily refined, the difficulties of reporting data accurately increased also, aggravated by the constant high mobility of the refugee population and the continuing hazards of security which from time to time impede access to places where refugees are located.

Despite all this, the quality and quantity of data has improved steadily, but it is unreasonable to assume that counting and classifying a volatile population of several million in over 850 different locations in the midst of wartime conditions can ever achieve the degree of accuracy to which auditors are accustomed.

CORDS and the Ministry are continuing their efforts to produce data which is essential for managing and monitoring all aspects of the refugee and social welfare programs. However, since these reports must be produced by the same people who carry the full burden of responsibility for operations, both the Ministry and CORDS must guard against the danger of imposing accuracy requirements which demand a disproportionate amount of the time of the operating officials.

3. (b) Number of War Victims

"During 1969 the number of refugees declined from a high of over 1.4 million in February to a low of 268,000 in December. This decrease is misleading because of:

A reluctance by the Government of Vietnam to report new refugees, a policy of claiming refugees as resettled on the basis of payment of allowances even though many of these people need more help,

An apparent misinterpretation by Vietnamese officials which resulted in refugees being classified as returned to their original village or resettled when the Government of Vietnam only promised to pay allowances,

A policy of classifying refugees as returned to their original village and presumably self-sufficient when, in fact, many of them still cannot earn a living, and

A policy of removing from the rolls refugees living outside of camps who have received their temporary allowances, which terminate benefits until such time as they are able to return to their original villages.

"Other persons have suffered because of the war and are in need of assistance—war widows, orphans, and the physically disabled. The actual number in these categories is not known. There are, however, an estimated 258,000 orphans, 131,000 war widows, and 183,000 disabled persons. Some assistance had been provided these people by the Government of Vietnam."

Comments

While we agree that the statistical reports have been a source of confusion, we find it unfortunate that this GAO Report, like earlier ones, has again given undue emphasis to the importance of numbers. No less than 18 of the 39 substantive pages of the text are given over to a critique of the refugee statistics. Preoccupation with questions of statistical definitions and measurements of progress should not be allowed to obscure the basic fact, important in human and political terms, that very substantial progress has been made, through the dedicated efforts of Vietnamese and U.S. personnel, in meeting the needs of vast numbers of people.

Much of the controversy over the number of refugees stems from a misinterpretation of the figures on which it is based. It has its origin in the fact that the cumulative total of refugees and the current total of refugees are frequently confused.

The "cumulative total" is the number of persons who since the beginning of an organized, identifiable refugee program have been officially recognized by the MSW and its predecessor agency, the Commissariat for Refugees, as refugees, or who, to express it differently, have been on the government's refugee rolls at one time or another.

Estimates of the cumulative total vary depending on what categories of war victims are included. However, there is now general agreement that since 1964 approximately 3½ million persons have been, at one time or another on the refugee rolls. By adding to the officially recognized refugees other categories of "war victims" like the one million persons displaced temporarily by the 1968 Tet and May offensives, the repatriates from Cambodia, and the persons entitled to various forms of compensation because of war related damages to life, limbs, and property, the cumulative total of refugees and war victims reaches 5.3 million persons.

The current total of refugees consists of those persons who are, at any given time, on the refugee rolls (in the "Active Caseload"). They are the persons who have not yet received all the benefits (temporary benefits, resettlement benefits, return-to-village benefits, and war victim benefits) to which they are entitled. This total fluctuates from month to month, depending on how many new refugees and war victims are added to the rolls, and how many are removed after they have received all benefits. On 31 December 1970, this figure stood at 428,000 refugees and 70,000 war victims.

As to the much criticized drastic reduction in the current total from 1.4 million in February to 270,000 in December 1969, the explanation lies in part in the fact that during this period those who had received previously or received at that time all the benefits to which they were entitled were dropped from the active rolls. Unfortunately, both CORDS and AID/Washington failed at the time to explain properly these statistical adjustments. The Government of Vietnam did not claim, as the report charges, "that refugees had been resettled on the basis of payment of allowances even though many of these people need more help." Unfortunately, the statistical summaries prepared by CORDS reported those who had received resettlement benefits under the abbreviated column heading "resettled." This has since been corrected. The removal from the rolls of large numbers of refugees living outside of camps, which accounted for another part of the reduction in the active caseload, was justified because most of these persons are in fact self-resettled and are as well, and sometimes even better off than their neighbors, and are economically self-sufficient. They remain eligible for full return-to-village benefits if, and when they, return to their original hamlets.

4. Refugees from Cambodia—GAO

"About 159,000 persons had left Cambodia as of July 1970 to seek refuge in South Vietnam—10,000 Cambodian refugees and 149,000 Vietnamese repatriates. They are not recognized as Vietnam refugees but are reported separately as refugees from Cambodia."

Comments

According to the latest available information, a total of approximately 210,000 ethnic Vietnamese have fled from Cambodia to Vietnam since March 1970. By March 1971, 155,000 had been paid self-resettlement allowances and have melted into the population. Another 55,000 are currently participating in GVN group resettlement projects, most of which are succeeding very well.

There are no reports of any ethnic Vietnamese returning to Cambodia. However, approximately 3,000 ethnic Cambodians and Cambodian Montagnards have returned to that country from Vietnam.

As of February 1971 the GVN had allocated VN\$587 million and expended VN\$350 million for Temporary Relief and Resettlement of the Cambodian Repatriates. The amount of VN\$600 million was transferred from the CORDS Special Fund to the Ministry's American Aid Chapter to replace the funds used for relief for the Cambodian repatriates.

The integration of the repatriates has been greatly facilitated by the fact that many of them are from urban areas and have skills which can be readily utilized in the Vietnamese economy. Nevertheless, the quick response of the GVN in meeting the needs of such a large number of new arrivals, while maintaining relief assistance to the active case load of in-country refugees is a striking accomplishment in the field of social welfare which is not likely to be matched by other developing countries in peacetime—much less in time of war.

5. War Victims in Urban Areas—GAO

"The number of persons seeking refuge in urban areas (primarily Saigon) is unknown but is estimated at one million. Because of high employment most people find jobs; however, these jobs are usually dependent on the presence of U.S. troops. The unemployed in the urban areas receive no assistance from the Government of Vietnam or the Agency for International Development and are dependent on relatives and voluntary agencies. An estimated 600,000 people are dependent upon the presence of U.S. troops but no plans have been formulated to deal with these people when the troops withdraw. The United States and the Government of Vietnam anticipate that most of these people will want to return to their original homes."

Comments

It is estimated that approximately one million persons have moved from rural

to urban areas since 1965 either to seek refuge or more advantageous employment opportunities. It is difficult to distinguish between the influx associated with the characteristic "urban drift" which is a world-wide phenomenon and that attributable to insecurity in the countryside.

At the very beginning of the refugee program the GVN adopted a policy designed to discourage further overcrowding in congested cities and to facilitate return of refugees to their own villages as soon as possible by not registering as refugees persons who moved into urban areas on their own initiative.

In 1968, as security improved, the GVN initiated return-to-village benefits payable to registered refugees and other displaced persons who were forced to flee from their villages but were never registered as refugees. Among the hundreds of thousands who have returned to their villages and received RTV benefits since 1968, a substantial number were persons not previously registered as refugees who returned from urban areas.

Although unemployment has not surfaced as an urban problem to date, it is recognized that reduction in the American presence both military and civilian, will entail a period of economic readjustment. This will in part be offset by the inducements or improved economic opportunities in rural areas particularly for unskilled workers once post-war development gets underway. In addition to entitlement to return-to-village benefits, land reform, improved agricultural systems, the village self-development program and other plans still on the drawing board for new land development will assist significant numbers to return to farming under more promising circumstances than before.

It is not possible to estimate the proportion of the persons now in urban areas who will remain regardless of economic or other hardship. To date, detailed plans have not been formulated to deal with accompanying urban problems. However, the GVN has taken steps to improve the environmental situation of all city dwellers such as housing, sanitation, creation of urban cadres to assist in local community efforts. These steps are as yet insufficient and a new office has been established within the U.S. Mission to assist the GVN and municipal authorities in more adequate planning for urban development. The MSW through grants to Vietnamese voluntary organizations is encouraging their efforts to assist with the problems of war victims in urban areas.

6. Status of Site Facilities—GAO

"There is still a considerable shortage of facilities—needed by war victims—such as housing, classrooms, wells, medical and sanitation facilities, and many of those that exist are inadequate."

Comments

The GAO states correctly that many of the refugee sites which are still in use and which will continue to be used for some time to come are seriously defective in one respect or another. Many such sites will continue in use either because the occupants cannot yet return to their original villages for lack of security, or because the occupants do not wish to leave at the present time due to the fact that their present, albeit inadequate, location offers them opportunities to support themselves which they think are better than what they can find elsewhere.

Upgrading of existing sites has not received the attention which was contemplated earlier, because the MSW, understandably and properly, gave first priority to the massive distribution of the basic benefits to which the refugees are entitled and whose distribution had fallen behind every time the refugees are engaged in a program was interrupted by some sudden emergency.

Nevertheless, much work was done in this area in 1970. The attached tabulation of "Statistics on Development Projects carried out from January 1, 1970 to December 31, 1970" shows that the Ministry allocated VN\$171.3 million, and expended VN\$121.4 million for 350 classrooms, 30 Maternity Dispensaries; 183 self-help projects and the conduct of 170 vocational training classes.

The GVN's 1971 "Self Defense and Community Development Plan" has assigned a high priority to the upgrading of existing sites. At the end of 1970, 354 out of the 864 refugee sites were reported as being defective in one respect or another. CORDS and MSW have now singled out, for priority attention those sites which are most in need of improvement, are likely to remain in use for some time to come and which are economically sufficiently viable to justify the investment of improvement funds.

7. Correlation between Refugees Resettled and Amount of Resettlement Funds Expended—GAO

"GAO was not able to correlate spending with the number of refugees reported as resettled or returned home because (1) the number of refugees reported to

be resettled was not accurate and (2) refugees living in temporary camps, and scheduled for transfer into resettlement sites, did not receive monetary housing allowance if housing was provided."

Comments

The report correctly states that it is not possible to correlate the increases or decreases in the number of refugees resettled and the increase or decrease in allowances paid. This is due to the nature of the variable involved. In the first place, the number of refugees to be counted in such correlations poses some difficulty considering that (1) refugees living outside of camps who have received temporary allowances and are in fact resettled receive no resettlement benefits and are taken off the active rolls until such time as they may return to their original village when they become entitled to full return-to-village benefits; and (2) there may be duplications in reporting of resettled refugees who subsequently return to their villages.

The main factor, however, making precise correlation impossible stems from the fact that some payments are made not in money but in kind, and additionally most are made in installments which overlap the beginnings and ends of fiscal years. Thus a simple division of number of people into a sum of money expended in a certain time would not reliably indicate the expenditure per refugee.

8. Piaster Fund Releases by Ministry of Social Welfare—GAO

"Slow spending continues to be a problem in the refugee and social welfare program. As a result many refugees vacated controlled areas and returned to Viet Cong areas."

During the first 5 months of 1970, only 12 percent of the resettlement fund and 1 percent of the special welfare fund had been spent. During 1969—the first year funds were provided for comprehensive social welfare—only 6 percent was used. Of the remaining funds, 28 percent were never spent and 66 percent were authorized for 1970 spending or transferred to other projects."

Comments

The GAO correctly reports slow expenditures of refugee resettlement funds in the first half of 1969 and in the first five months of 1970. They also correctly report that by the end of 1969, 94 percent of the funds budgeted for this purpose had been expended. By the end of 1970, 73 percent of funds budgeted for temporary relief and war victims, and 91 percent of funds budgeted for resettlement and return-to-village benefits had been expended. The disastrous floods in Region I during the autumn of 1970 causing displacement of 300,000 persons and necessitating concentration of efforts upon providing disaster relief were a major factor delaying both expenditures for refugee resettlement and return-to-village benefits and implementation of development projects to upgrade resettlement sites.

Nevertheless, the rate of spending for these programs is a problem and continues to receive attention by the U.S. Mission and MSW. The GVN procedures for release and expenditure of funds is complicated and not well adapted to emergency conditions. Changes in these procedures to increase flexibility are taking place. Resettlement, as other expenditures, however, always increase in the last half of the year. The slow start in the first months is basically caused by fiscal complexities at national and provincial levels largely beyond controls of a single Ministry.

After an intensive investigation, the Mission finds no evidence to substantiate the GAO statement that as a result of slow disbursement of resettlement benefits in Region IV "many refugees vacated controlled areas and returned to Viet Cong areas."

As regards assistance to the GVN social welfare program, the GAO correctly reports that counterpart funds for social welfare activities were first provided in 1969 and that slow spending of these funds continues to be a problem. However, of the VN \$96,446,000 budgeted for the social welfare program in 1970, 99 percent was obligated by the end of the year.

The factors contributing to the slow development of a basic social welfare program by the MSW simultaneously with meeting the overwhelming demands of massive refugee needs are correctly reported by the GAO. With the dramatic changes in the refugee situation, more attention is now being focused upon social welfare training to strengthen the capability of GVN personnel at ministerial and province levels to upgrade and further develop social welfare programs particularly for widows, orphans and disabled war victims. The MSW

recognizes the importance of initiating plans and establishing the framework for a comprehensive social reconstruction and rehabilitation program. The GAO Report fails to make any reference to the fact that the Western concept of government responsibility for social welfare was virtually unknown in Vietnam until a few years ago. It will probably take several years before a system of public social welfare services and institutions can be developed in Vietnam.

9. U.S. Commodity Support—GAO

"The United States contributed food during fiscal years 1968, 1969, and 1970 worth \$10 million, \$14 million, and \$20 million, respectively. About half of the commodities are distributed by the Government of Vietnam and the other half by voluntary agencies. The commodities are not distributed on the basis of need and therefore some inequities have resulted."

Comments

Since the GAO auditors reviewed the program, the distribution of PL 480 Title II surplus food commodities has been completely reorganized. Further shipment of certain commodities not acceptable to Vietnamese for human consumption, and consequently diverted to the recipients to use as animal feed, i.e. bulgur wheat, cornmeal, CSM and rolled oats, have been suspended. The level of shipments programmed for FY's 1971 and 1972 have been substantially reduced to bring them in line with actual need of eligible recipients. Overall control over both direct government distribution and distribution by participating voluntary agencies has been concentrated in the Ministry of Social Welfare and accounting controls over distributions in the field have been tightened. A joint committee composed of representatives of MSW, CORDS, USAID, and the voluntary agencies has been established to serve as advisory committee to the Ministry to oversee the program.

Because of the magnitude of this program (2.9 million recipients in FY 1971) it is impossible to conduct any kind of a means test to make certain that only "needy" people receive surplus food commodities. However, the tighter controls now instituted should substantially reduce the likelihood of less needy employed persons receiving such commodities.

As far as U.S. provided project commodities are concerned, their number and quantities have been greatly reduced in recent years. Except for tents and tarpaulins, none of the commodities mentioned by the GAO have been procured since 1969. Only 1,000 tents and 250 tarpaulins were programmed for FY 1971 and only 500 tents and no tarpaulins are programmed for FY 1972. Tents and tarpaulins are prime requirements for the emergency reception of new refugees and must be available in country at all times.

STATISTICS ON DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
CARRIED OUT FROM 1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 1970

Republic of Vietnam
Ministry of Social Welfare
Department of Refugee Training and
Vocational Training and Development Service

MILITARY REGIONS	PROJECTS	FUNDS ALLOCATED	FUNDS EXPENDED	FUNDS REIMBURSED TO MSN	OPERATIONS PERFORMED	NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS	REMARKS
MR 1	Education	29,997,325\$	25,976,171\$		1,109 Classrooms	6,530	(a) Funds Allocated 171,332,466\$
	Health	4,137,234	2,484,000		6 Maternity Disp.	2,390	Funds Reimbursed 3,080,233\$
	Self Help	4,325,865	4,325,865		30 Projects	11,060 Persons	to MSN
	Voc. Training	11,155,800	6,751,626		29 COURSES	870	166,272,233\$
Total	50,616,379\$	37,658,016					
MR 2	Education	20,332,517\$	14,897,342\$	200,000\$	74 Classrooms	4,664 Students	(b) SELF-HELP PROJECTS
	Health	6,100,000	1,906,183		4 Maternity Disp.	1,275 Persons	Apparel & Finery
	Self Help	10,030,000	5,745,708		115 Projects	27,506 Persons	Construction
	Voc. Training	9,278,500	6,861,436	525,000\$	37 COURSES	955	Animal Husbandry
Total	47,811,017\$	29,390,669\$	725,000\$			Farming	
MR 3	Education	13,136,000\$	7,078,824\$	600,000\$	28 Classrooms	600 Persons	Building of Road,
	Health	3,200,000	1,780,000		3 Maternity Disp.	Not Yet Reported	Play Yard
	Self Help	926,000	917,500		16 Projects	1,611	
	Voc. Training	2,624,070	1,916,120	600,000\$	10 COURSES	212	
Total	19,886,070\$	11,692,444\$					
MR 4	Education	23,189,000\$	15,414,177\$	1,147,233\$	99 Classrooms	1,340 Students	(c) Vocational Training
	Health	10,350,000	9,094,153		17 Maternity Disp.	Not Yet Reported	Mechanics
	Self Help	350,000	Not Yet Reported	350,000	Not Yet Reported	Not Yet Reported	Automobile
	Voc. Training	5,270,000	4,190,625	248,000	21 COURSES	683	Sewing
Total	39,309,000\$	28,498,933\$	1,655,233\$			Iron Industry	
Technical Schools Ministry of Education	Voc. Training	16,000,000\$	13,963,156\$		70 Courses	1,130 Students	Wood Industry
							Construction
							Engines
							Electronics
GRAND TOTAL	Education	171,332,466\$	121,400,220\$	3,080,233\$			Wireless Sec
	Health	86,636,862\$	63,366,514\$				Machinery
	Self Help	23,939,234	15,264,216	2,047,233\$			Accounting
	Voc. Training	66,328,370	43,650,407	783,000			Mechanical Drafting
Total	272,236,870	224,681,350	5,910,466\$				Industrial Electricity
GRAND TOTAL	Education	20,332,517\$	14,897,342\$	200,000\$			Typing
	Health	6,100,000	1,906,183				Hot Making
	Self Help	10,030,000	5,745,708				Embroidering
	Voc. Training	9,278,500	6,861,436	525,000\$			Barber
Total	47,811,017\$	29,390,669\$	725,000\$			Bamboo Knitting	
GRAND TOTAL	Education	29,997,325\$	25,976,171\$				Stamping Hat Making
	Health	4,137,234	2,484,000				Sewing
	Self Help	4,325,865	4,325,865				Planting Hat Making
	Voc. Training	11,155,800	6,751,626				
Total	50,616,379\$	37,658,016					

1. Saigon, December 31, 1970
Chief of Vocational Training and Development Service

LIST OF 60 REFUGEE SITES HAVING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN 1970

Page 1 of 4 Pages

Order Number (1)	Name of Resettlement Camp or Refugee Banlet (2)	EDUCATION AND HEALTH		SELF HELP		Number of Classrooms Authorized (7)	VOCATIONAL TRAINING Funds Allocated (8)	TOTAL FUNDS (9)
		Number of Projects Authorized (3)	Funds Allocated (4)	Number of Projects Authorized (5)	Funds Allocated (6)			
1	<u>TINH QUANG-TRI PROVINCE</u> Ha-Phanh	0	0	0	0	2 Sewing 2 Carpentry	815,500\$	815,500\$
2	<u>TINH THUA-THIEN</u> Thuan-An	1 Maternity Clinic	400,000\$	3 Pig Raising	150,000\$	1 Hot Making	225,000	775,000
3	Ton That Xa	2 Classrooms	290,000	0	0	3 Sewing	624,000	914,000
4	Loc Thuy	2 Classrooms	290,000	3 Pig Raising	150,000	0	0	440,000
5	Thuy-Luong	4 Classrooms	580,000	2 Pig Raising	100,000	0	0	680,000
6	<u>DA-NANG</u> Dong Phuoc (My Khe)	12 Classrooms 4 Kindergarten 1 Maternity Clinic	4,285,000	0	0	4 Classroom Const.	380,000	4,675,000
7	<u>TINH QUANG-NAM</u> Xuyen-Chau	2 Kindergarten	310,000	0	0	1 Sewing	248,100	558,100
8	Trung-Phuoc	2 Kindergarten	310,000	0	0	1 Sewing	248,100	558,100
9	Thuan-Tinh	2 Kindergarten	310,000	0	0	1 Sewing	248,100	558,100
10	<u>TINH QUANG-DAI</u> Ha-Tay	2 Classrooms	290,000	3 Agriculture & Fishery Equipment	155,000	3 Barber	249,000	694,000
11	Rung-Lang	3 Classrooms 2 Kindergarten	745,000	10 Market, Hall & Road Construction	500,000	1 Sewing	228,000	1,473,000
12	La-Ha	4 Classrooms 2 Kindergarten	890,000	8 Market & Hall Construction, Land Rental	426,000	0	0	1,316,000
13	Cao-Dai	2 Classrooms	310,000	3 Brick Kiln Const.	150,000	1 Sewing 1 Woodworking	456,000	916,000
14	Battangan	0	0	25 Fishery Equipment	1,251,000	0	0	1,251,000

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LIST OF 60 REFUGEE SITES HAVING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN 1970

Page 2 of 4 Pages

Order Number (1)	Name of Resettlement Camp or Refugee Banlet (2)	EDUCATION AND HEALTH		SELF HELP		Number of Classrooms Authorized (7)	VOCATIONAL TRAINING Funds Allocated (8)	TOTAL FUNDS (9)
		Number of Projects Authorized (3)	Funds Allocated (4)	Number of Projects Authorized (5)	Funds Allocated (6)			
15	Thanh-That	2 Kindergarten	310,000\$	0	0	1 Sewing Class	228,000\$	538,000\$
16	<u>TINH QUANG-TIEN</u> Ha-Lam	3 Classrooms	435,000	0	0	0	0	435,000
17	<u>TINH BINH-DINH</u> Go NIT	3 Classrooms	435,000	0	0	1 Sewing	228,000	663,000
18	<u>TINH BINH-THUAN</u> Song Trao	2 Classrooms	500,000	3 Goat Raising	150,000	1 Sewing	199,030	849,030
19	Canh-Dien	2 Classrooms	500,000	3 Goat Raising	150,000	1 Sewing	199,030	849,030
20	<u>TINH CAVA-RANH</u> My-Ca	1 Maternity Clinic	1,500,000	0	0	1 Carpentry	288,000	1,778,000
21	<u>TINH DAN-LAC</u> Buen Ho	1 Maternity Clinic	1,600,000	0	0	0	0	1,600,000
22	Buen Cu Kuk	6 Classrooms	990,000	0	0	0	0	990,000
23	Buen M'Dot	4 Classrooms	720,000	0	0	0	0	720,000
24	<u>TINH LAM-DONG</u> Tan Bai-Thuong	0	0	6 Oxen Raising	300,000	0	0	300,000
25	Klong Trao	2 Classrooms	300,000	0	0	0	0	300,000
26	<u>TINH KHOA-THUAN</u> Binh Son	4 Classrooms	640,000	0	0	1 Sewing	218,000	858,000
27	<u>TINH FIEKHY</u> Phu Nhon III	4 Classrooms 1 Maternity Clinic	1,150,000	3 Agriculture(Seeds)	150,000	0	0	1,700,000
28	Koachrak	2 Classrooms	420,000	3 Agriculture(Seeds)	150,000	0	0	570,000
29	Plei-de-Lia	2 Classrooms	420,000	3 Agriculture(Seeds)	150,000	0	0	570,000
30	Thanh-An	0	0	3 Agriculture(Seeds)	150,000	1 Sewing	114,000	264,000
31	<u>TINH TUYEN-DUC</u> M'Lon	2 Classrooms	420,000	4 Pig Raising	700,000	1 Sewing	285,000	905,000
32	Dagun	1 Classroom 1 Maternity Clinic	910,000	4 Pig Raising	200,000	0	0	1,110,000
33	<u>TINH KHANH-HO</u> Cu Thanh	0	0	1 Chicken Raising	30,000	1 Sewing	242,000	292,000

59

LIST OF 60 SITES HAVING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN 1970

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
34	Tinh Quang-Duc Nhiem Can	0	0	3 Pig Raising	140,000	1 Sewing	239,150	379,150
35	Tinh Phu-Bon Ca Lui 1	0	0	9 Pig Raising	480,000	0	0	480,000
36	Tinh Kontum Plektrong	0	0	9 Goat Raising	450,000	0	0	450,000
37	MR 9 Tinh Long-An Ngä Tu Ky-Son	3 Classrooms	435,000	2 Play-yard/Ditch Const	100,000	0	0	535,000
38	Nhan Nhung	1 Classroom	145,000	2 Road Building	100,000	0	0	245,000
39	Vam Thu	4 Classrooms	580,000	0	0	0	0	580,000
40	Thu-Thu	4 Classrooms	580,000	0	0	0	0	580,000
41	Tinh Phuoc-Lam Dong-Khai	2 Classrooms 1 Kindergarten 1 Maternity Clinic 1 Medicine Station	1,185,000	0	0	0	0	1,185,000
42	Buward	2 Classrooms 1 Kindergarten	686,000	0	0	0	0	686,000
43	Tinh Ban-Phu Loc-Nhe	7 Classrooms	1,015,000	0	0	0	0	1,015,000
44	Tinh Jay-Ninh Ban-Wang(Quan Khieu-Hach)	3 Classrooms 1 Kindergarten 1 Medicine Station	890,000	0	0	1 Sewing	228,000	1,118,000
45	Tinh Gia-Dinh Tan-Hoa	2 Classrooms 1 Maternity Clinic	790,000	0	0	0	0	790,000
46	An-Nghia	2 Classrooms 1 Maternity Clinic	790,000	0	0	0	0	790,000
47	MR 4 Tinh An-Giang (Nui-Choc)	3 Classrooms	396,000	0	0	2 Sewing	382,000	778,000
48	Qui-Long	3 Classrooms	435,000	0	0	0	0	435,000
49	Tinh An-Nuyen Ban-Hong	3 Classrooms 1 Medicine Station	1,010,000	0	0	0	0	1,010,000

LIST OF 60 SITES HAVING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN 1970

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
50	Binh-Hung	4 Classrooms	680,000	0	0	0	0	680,000
51	Cai-Bot-Van	4 Classrooms	1,020,000	0	0	0	0	1,020,000
52	Tinh Kien-Giang Tam-Xang	3 Classrooms 1 Kindergarten 1 Maternity/Med Clinic	1,090,000	1 Pig Raising 1 Kindergarten 1 Maternity/Med Clinic	50,000	0	0	1,140,000
53	Dong-Thu	3 Classrooms	590,000	1 Bridge Building	50,000	0	0	640,000
54	Tinh Vinh-Lam Cai-Quan	3 Classrooms 1 Maternity/Med Clinic	935,000	0	0	0	0	935,000
55	Tuong-Ngai	4 Classrooms 1 Maternity/Med Clinic	1,080,000	0	0	0	0	1,080,000
56	Ngai-Lo	3 Classrooms 1 Maternity Clinic	935,000	0	0	0	0	935,000
57	An-Hoa	4 Classrooms 1 Maternity Clinic	1,080,000	0	0	0	0	1,080,000
58	Tinh Mac-Liem Cai-Day	1 Maternity Clinic	2,000,000	0	0	0	0	2,000,000
59	Tinh Vinh-Binh Phu-Tho	2 Classrooms 1 Kindergarten	603,000	0	0	0	0	603,000
60	Tinh Kien-Tuong Hoc-Cu	2 Classrooms 1 Maternity Clinic	790,000	0	0	0	0	790,000

Saigon, January 12, 1971
 Action of National Training
 Department of Health Education and
 Development Bureau

PHAM-THI-KIM-LEPH

AID COMMENTS ON GAO REPORT ENTITLED "CIVILIAN HEALTH AND WAR-RELATED CASUALTY PROGRAMS IN VIETNAM"

1. GAO

No specific AID project exists to care for civilian war-related casualties. Assistance to these people is provided under a medical care project as part of the AID health program.

Comment

The GAO Report notes "A.I.D. considers the treatment of civilian war casualties (CWCs) as a high priority item within the total Vietnam program. A primary goal of the United States in Vietnam for FY '71 is to ease the suffering of civilians displaced or injured by the war . . ."

The United States and Free World assistance has been provided to the Ministry of Health (MOH) provincial and prefectural health services since 1963. This assistance, which focused during most of the time on CWC care, is provided by U.S. Military and Provincial Health Assistance Program (MILPHAP) teams; USAID contract teams (8 Korean and 1 Chinese teams); the American Medical Association Volunteer Physicians for Vietnam program (AMA/VPVN); the U.S. Catholic Conference and the International Rescue Committee. Free World voluntary medical teams, which receive USAID logistics support in varying degrees, also provide assistance.

While skilled medical manpower available for civilian care in Vietnam is limited, significant improvement has been shown over the past two years. This improvement in the GVN capability to provide improved medical care to CWCs, refugees, and the general population, is partially attributable to more effective utilization of GVN medical manpower and facilities. Implementation of the GVN decree which called for a joint utilization of military and civilian health manpower and facilities, resulted in additional ARVN personnel provided to 26 province hospitals and 185 districts. Thus far, 1600 military personnel have been assigned to MOH staff.

As a result of the increased responsibility taken by the Vietnamese in this program—as joint utilization has become operational—it has been possible to reduce the MILPHAP personnel and USAID-funded operational personnel (e.g., general duty nurses).

MOH and USAID policy focuses on upgrading medical practices and facilities for better medical care, including CWC. Both MOH and USAID require top priority by given CWC. There is no change in this policy, although CWC are currently 8% of hospital admissions.

2. GAO

No reliable data are available on the total number of civilian war-related casualties in Vietnam.

Comment

In October 1967 at the hearing held before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees of the Committee on the Judiciary, the then Administrator of the Agency for International Development, Mr. Gaud, testified: ". . . We have records we consider adequate of the number of people that have been treated, I think it is fair to say that the only figures that we have with reference to civilian casualties are the number of admissions to the hospitals.

" . . . The estimates beyond that are only estimates. * * *

" . . . We can tell you how many civilian casualties are treated in hospitals and we have that figure and we think it is an accurate figure, but we can't tell you and I don't think anybody can tell you how many civilian casualties are wounded in the boondocks, who don't get local treatment, and don't report their injuries and the like. These are figures that don't exist."

Dr. Hannah, Administrator for A.I.D., at the hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, held in June 1969, in his statements to the Subcommittee reported: "While it is impossible to be precise as to the numbers of civilians killed or injured in the fighting in Vietnam, we do have quite reliable information as to the numbers of civilian war-related cases admitted to and treated in hospitals."

To our knowledge the GVN or U.S. Government sources do not cite CWC hospital admissions as a total figure. It is recognized that additional numbers of CWCs are treated at either facilities or not treated at all. There is no accurate method of determining the exact number of such cases and estimates of total CWCs are speculative.

3. GAO. . . . Although some improvements have occurred with respect to Vietnamese medical personnel shortages, there is a continuing need for most medical specialties—primarily because of low Government salaries and the military draft.

Comment

The GVN has recognized the importance of the civilian medical program and has placed greater emphasis on improving and increasing medical service available to the civilian population. Two important indicators of the increased GVN concern for the level of medical care available to the civilian populace—manpower and funds—show a definite positive change in recent years. The following chart illustrates the significant increases in staff and funding for the MOH hospitals from 1966 to 1971:

	MOH staffing				Funding (VN dollars in thousands)			
	1966	1969	1970	1971	1966	1969	1970	1971
National and regular hospitalization	3,533	4,597	6,400	6,257	438,220	936,280	1,243,500	1,456,500
Providing health services and hospitalization	3,613	11,026	14,100	15,829	341,580	1,426,786	1,802,000	2,184,900
Total	7,146	15,623	20,500	22,086	779,800	2,363,066	3,045,500	3,641,400

Further, regarding the improvement in Vietnamese medical personnel, the increased emphasis on training should be noted.

The University of Saigon Faculty of Medicine is by international standards a very large medical school. Its graduating class (191 in 1970) is one of the largest in the world and the graduation of more than 200 physicians yearly from the Saigon and Hue Medical Schools is resulting in a 12.5 percent increase in physician strength annually, probably one of the largest annual increases in the world. The enlargement of the dental clinic space to be completed by June 1971 will make it possible to increase graduates to a maximum of 60 per annum. In the meantime, in dental as in medical education, particular emphasis is being placed on upgrading the quality of teaching, and on improving patient care, through the development and implementation of a modern curriculum and use of post-graduate training courses.

The number of nursing schools and, consequently, the number of graduate nurses has increased considerably. Since 1966 seven additional assistant nurse schools have been opened and the number of nurse graduates for 1970 has increased to 785 from 400 in 1966. The expected improvement in patient care has been slow to develop, however, in part because of other priorities and in part because of a traditional understanding of the role of the nurse which limited her actions and authority within the hospital and, consequently, within the Ministry of Health. An administrative step designed to correct this situation was taken on November 11, 1969, when the Bureau of Nursing was raised to a higher organization level in order to effect a higher status, increased allowances for Bureau personnel, and more authority to deal with nursing problems in provincial hospitals.

It is impossible to say that patient care provided by nurses has improved to the degree desired by American advisors. Nonetheless, the basis for improvement is firmly laid. The steps described above are leading in a direction which will permit an increasing recognition and acceptance of the nurse's function along the lines of modern Western nursing care. The present Minister of Health has firmly proposed that the nursing care program be further developed along such lines.

Progress in the Laboratory Technology project in 1969-70 is considered to be among the most rapid in the public health sector. A classification of all laboratories located in MOH facilities has been completed and standardized procedural manuals and supply kits have been provided, resulting in the increased use of diagnostic laboratory analysis by VN medical personnel.

The Laboratory Advisory Program has indeed established requirement goals for laboratory technicians and has made estimates of additional technicians required. Approximately 560 additional graduates of the one year assistant laboratory technician course will be required to staff hospital laboratories, malaria control activities, and dispensaries. This goal should be reached in the latter

part of 1973, if current training rates are maintained. Approximately 250 technicians, with 3 years of training, will be needed for hospital laboratories, dispensaries, and as teachers for the laboratory schools. If training of three year technicians begins in autumn 1971, as planned, this goal should be reached in autumn 1980.

4. GAO

While the Ministry of Health has increased spending for hospital maintenance over the past few years, AID considers the amount inadequate, since facilities are reported to be deteriorating and lacking essential utilities. Also, equipment is poorly maintained.

Comment

Difficulties have been encountered in the operation and maintenance of utilities systems at Vietnam civilian medical facilities. The problem is not one of design but rather a lack of understanding on the part of hospital personnel and patients with regard to the proper use of these facilities. The resolution requires a more extensive effort in health education rather than a provision of additional commodities or the redesign and construction of additional systems. The long range master plans developed by AID contractors are being utilized by the Ministry of Health as they make improvements in various hospitals. Increased implementation of these plans must await the realignment of priorities following hostilities.

5. GAO

The Government of Vietnam long-range medical plans apparently do not consider the possibility of transferring excess Vietnamese military facilities to the Ministry of Health following an end to hostilities and the resulting reduction in military patient loads.

Comment

The Mission and GVN are conducting joint reviews for the utilization of excess U.S. and GVN military facilities by the Ministry of Health. The selection of these sites is the result of careful planning to insure that the Ministry of Health possesses the capability to staff and operate these facilities.

APPENDIX II

A SURVEY OF CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTIES AMONG REFUGEES FROM THE PLAIN OF JARS, LAOS, BY WALTER M. HANEY, AND TEXT OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE CHAIRMAN AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN

JULY 26, 1971.

HON. WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN,
Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN: Just a note to say how much I appreciated your helpful participation in the Subcommittee hearing last week.

As we discussed at the hearing, I am formally submitting a copy of Mr. Walter Haney's "Survey of Civilian Casualties Among Refugees from the Plain of Jars". I would appreciate the Department's evaluation of the survey as well as a comment on its conclusions and what action, if any, has been taken in light of its findings.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Refugees.

AUGUST 10, 1971.

HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter of July 26, 1971 forwarding a copy of Mr. Walter Haney's report entitled, "Survey of Civilian Casualties Among Refugees from the Plain of Jars". I have read his report with close attention and with interest, and have found it to be a serious and carefully prepared piece of work.

I know Mr. Haney and have talked with him in recent weeks. He is an objective and conscientious young man who is personally attached to the Lao people with whom he has been associated as an IVS volunteer and a teacher during the past few years. His paper seems to be a conscientious one-man effort to survey civilian casualties on the Plain of Jars. As he says, it is not intended to be a complete survey but rather a study "comprised of all those case histories of civilian war victims which I could gather in the time available to me".

The persons he interviewed were drawn from the same or similar groups of refugees who figured in the Plain of Jars Survey conducted by the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane in July, 1970. In fact, seven of the ten villages surveyed in both cases are either clearly identical or are villages whose inhabitants were once collocated in the same tasseng on the Plain of Jars.

The refugee villages visited by Mr. Haney contained a total of 8,500 people. Mr. Haney has gathered case histories from this population to demonstrate that 189 people died as a result of military action. A little over half of these deaths were a result of air action. Of this latter group, somewhat less than half were victims prior to 1968-69.

As I have previously testified, the fighting raged back and forth over the Plain of Jars and meticulous efforts were employed to minimize casualties resulting from that fighting. Even given the intensive fighting in 1969 when the Plain changed hands two or three times, the statistics in Mr. Haney's report indicate that this policy has been essentially successful. While 189 deaths out of an 8,500 population certainly constitute too many to have been caught in the war, they do nevertheless represent a small percentage of the total population, given the intensity of the fighting that took place.

As I testified before your Subcommittee on April 22 and July 22, the primary cause for the generation of refugees in Laos has been North Vietnamese military pressure. This statement, I believe, is still justified. At the same time, I also testified that fear of bombing was another factor and that this was doubtless a much more significant element in the minds of some 17,000 people from the Plain of Jars who were caught up in the fighting before they were removed to the Vientiane Plain.

We can not dispute Mr. Haney's conclusion that aerial bombardment was the primary cause of civilian casualties among the people he interviewed, although we have no reliable statistical basis for extending that conclusion to all those who previously lived in the Plain of Jars. On the other hand, we do not, on the basis of his evidence, accept his conclusion that the bombing of the civilian population was extensive. We believe that the policies which govern air operations were conscientiously construed by the United States Mission in Vientiane and we have no reason to believe that they were flagrantly disregarded by the pilots of the aircraft operating in that area.

Nevertheless, we have drawn the conclusions of the Haney report to the attention of our Mission and the appropriate United States military authorities concerned with air operations in Laos. We have instructed them to redouble their efforts to avoid incurring civilian casualties.

I would like to add a few comments on the subject of poison which is mentioned a number of times in the Haney survey. United States forces, of course, do not employ any poisons or poisonous weapons in Southeast Asia or elsewhere. While the description of the substances encountered by the refugees is far from being specific, we have, with the help of the Defense Department, come up with some possible explanations. For example, the long strips of silver paper correspond to an accurate description of radar chaff which is commonly used to interrupt or confuse enemy radar. It is nontoxic, being similar in substance to aluminum foil. The granular yellow powder remains unidentified, but the Defense Department notes that a wide variety of United States or communist equipment such as batteries, smoke cannisters, parachute flares, and the like could produce a residue resembling a powder, some of which could be toxic to plants, animals, and possibly to humans.

Finally, I wish to thank you again for the courtesy and serious purpose which have characterized the hearings of your Subcommittee when I have been a witness before it. It will be our continuing common purpose to ease the plight of those hapless civilians who have become victims of the fighting in Indochina.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

A SURVEY OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AMONG REFUGEES FROM THE
PLAIN OF JARS, LAOS

(By Walter M. Haney)
IVS VOLUNTEER, LAOS, 1970-71

A. Background to the Survey.

During the summer of 1970, I helped organize a program for Lao students to work during their school vacation. The program was funded by USAID Laos and organized by International Voluntary Services, Inc., Laos (IVS) together with the Lao Ministry of Youth and Sports. During the program, I became involved with students who were teaching refugee children in four camps near Vientiane. The refugees in these villages were part of the reported 15,000 who were evacuated from the Plain of Jars in February 1970. From their involvement with these refugees, the students in the summer program learned a great deal about the refugees' lives prior to their evacuation from the Plain of Jars. As the students told me of their experiences with the refugees, I became increasingly disturbed about what they had learned about bombing on the Plain of Jars. As a result of what I had learned from the students, I was moved to write a letter to the U.S. Ambassador to Laos, Mr. McMurtrie Godley, protesting what had evidently been the bombing of innocent civilians, (see Appendix B.) I also sent copies of this letter to my Senators in Washington, Senators Hart and Griffin from Michigan.